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BECAUSE OF certain new matters raised in the Brief of Appellee, Appellants 
deem it necessary to respond to and clarify those matters. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants reaffirm the statement of facts in their initial brief and make the 
following clarifications or corrections of some assertions made in Appellee's 
statement of facts: 
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On pages 3 and 4 of its brief, Appellee ("State Line") states that it demolished 
two motel units and commenced the demolition of others "in compliance with the 
desires of Tooele County Health and Human Services and the City of Wendover." 
It then quotes an internal report recommending that the units be "demolished or 
secured from entry". The fact is that the supposed "desires" of Tooele County and 
Wendover City were all stated (with one 3V2 year old exception) in internal 
communications and no order had been issued and no action taken by any 
governmental agency to require any demolition. Furthermore, all of those 
communications allowed the alternative of repairing or securing from entry (R.557, 
556, 555, 553). State Line was not required to do anything. Its actions were entirely 
voluntary. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. Demolition of the property was not required of State Line. It could have just 
"boarded" it up. State Line's wrongful demolition of the property is the special 
equity to move the conscience of the court and to show sufficient reason to allow an 
offset or recoupment against the amount demanded by State Line for redemption. 
State Line was not under any order or necessity of any kind to demolish the buildings 
on the property. That is an excuse raised after the fact to rationalize its behavior. 
That excuse is based on hearsay evidence which is not properly before the court. 
Nevertheless, that evidence disproves any necessity to demolish the property. 
II. State Line's assertions that Lewises failed to object to the lower court's order 
and raised facts outside the record are without merit. Contrary to the statements by 
State Line, Lewises made numerous objections to the orders and rulings of the lower 
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court. References by Lewises in their brief to facts claimed to be outside the record 
are obvious matters of which the court can take judicial notice. 
III. Lewises' substantive right to redeem should be upheld by reason of their strict 
compliance with the rules as well as by the principles of equity. Lewises' right of 
redemption is also a substantive right deserving at least as much protection as State 
Line's right. They have strictly complied with the statutory requirements but also 
qualify for the assistance of equity which is clearly applicable in mortgage foreclosure 
and redemption proceedings. State Line has shown no prejudice to it resulting from 
extension of the redemption period or from a redemption by Lewises. They, on the 
other hand, are greatly prejudiced if they are not allowed to redeem to save their 
own $427,460.00 interest in the motel. 
IV. State Line acted wrongfully whether or not it intended to do so. State Line's 
demolition of the property was clearly wrongful and intentional whether or not it 
intended to interfere with Lewises' right of redemption. It is the wrongful nature of 
its actions, as to the rights of Lewises, not its intent, which is the whole reason for 
any dispute in this case. This point was not raised for the first time on appeal. 
V. The terms "redemptioner", "purchaser" and "tenant in possession" are mutually 
exclusive as used in Rule 69. The purchaser under Rule 69 is the party who actually 
purchases at the sheriffs sale and the redemptioner is the party who actually redeems 
from the sale. A redemptioner is not a purchaser of the property. He already has 
an interest in the property which he is trying to keep by redeeming. Nor is the 
purchaser a tenant in possession of the property. He has no lease. He pays no rent. 
Instead, he is entitled to receive rent from the tenant in possession. Consistency 
requires that Rule 69(f)(3) be used to provide all remedies to the redemptioner while 
Rule 69(g)(1) be used to provide remedies to the purchaser. 
VI. Rule 69(f)(3) does not deny State Line due process. State Line's demand for 
due process is fully satisfied by Rule 69(f)(3). It submitted to the jurisdiction of the 
court voluntarily. It has possession of all the facts and evidence necessary for a 
hearing under Rule 69(f)(3) while Lewises do not. It is the Lewises who need time 
and notice in this proceeding. Yet, they are subject to Rule 69(f)(3) and are willing 
to live by the rule. If further time to prepare is needed, the court has the power to 
grant that. 
VII. State Line's authorities support Lewises right to redeem after a full 
determination of the reasonableness and propriety of the sum demanded for 
redemption. Each of the cases cited by State Line is either inapplicable to the facts 
of this case or is fully supportive of Lewises' position. State Line has demanded a 
sum from Lewises to redeem the property. It is in the position of the plaintiff in 
attempting to collect that sum or take the property which secures it. Lewises have 
the right, both under the law applicable to recoupment and offset, and under the 
provisions of Rule 69(f)(3), to challenge the sum demanded and have the dispute 
determined by the court before being forced, by State Line's ex parte demand, to 
place funds in its hands which they may never see again. They only want the 
property in return for what State Line legitimately has coming. 
A 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
STATE LINE'S DEMOLITION OF THE PROPERTY, BY ITSELF, 
JUSTIFIES EXTENSION OF THE REDEMPTION PERIOD AND SUCH 
DEMOLITION WAS NOT REQUIRED BY LAW NOR WAS IT 
NECESSARY TO PRESERVE OR PROTECT THE PROPERTY. 
Many of the cases relied upon by State Line, in its opposition to an extension 
of the redemption period and to a hearing to determine the redemption amount, 
include statements that their holdings would be otherwise if there existed facts to 
"move the conscience" of the court1 or if there had been alleged facts showing 
"sufficient excuse"2 or "unless some special equity exists in the pleader's favor".3 
In this case the actions of State Line in demolishing the improvements on the 
property have been asserted as the special equity to move the conscience of the court 
and to show sufficient excuse. Lewises were entitled to redeem the property in the 
condition it was in at the time of the sheriffs sale. Instead, they are left with a 
property having substantially reduced value. State Line's destruction of the property 
was totally wrongful and has significantly hindered Lewises' ability to redeem. State 
Line has attempted, in its brief, to excuse its actions by claiming that they were taken 
to comply with the "desires" of Tooele County Health and Human Services and the 
City of Wendover (Brief of Appellee, p.3). It then quotes from an internal report of 
the Tooele County Health and Human Services (p.4). The fact is that this is a 
1Mollerup v. Storage Svs. Int'L 569 P.2d 1122 (Utah 1977) at 1124; Tech-
Fluid Services, Inc. v. Gavilan Operating, Inc., 787 P.2d 1328 (Utah App. 1990) 
at 1333. 
2Goodwin v. Donihue, 299 Ala. 66, 155 So. 587 (1934) at 589. 
3Nutter v. Occidental Pet. Land & Dev. Corp., 117 Ariz. 548, 573 P.2d 532 
(1977) at 534. 
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rationalization excavated by State Line after the fact in an attempt to justify its > 
wrongful actions. 
This whole argument fails when it is realized that, after commencing the 
demolition of the property in March of 1989, State Line immediately stopped that 
demolition upon receiving a letter from Lewises that such demolition was destroying 
their redemption rights (R.593, 112). There was no restraining order against State 
Line. It stopped voluntarily, obviously because it knew it was violating Lewises' 
rights. No order of Wendover City or any other agency caused State Line to go 
ahead with the demolition and State Line did not proceed with the demolition. It 
was under no compulsion to halt the demolition other than the effect of its own guilty 
conscience for destroying Lewises' rights in the property. 
The citations by State Line to letters and internal reports of Wendover City and 
Tooele County Departments are improper because there is no foundation for 
admission of such documents into evidence. They are hearsay at best. But even 
those documents show that: 
1. The letter of October 31, 1985 applied only to Units 15-22 and not to the 
other 32 units and that letter had not been complied with for three and one-half 
years before the sheriffs sale (R.557). 
2. The letter of September 6, 1988 was addressed to Wendover City and not to 
the property owner and required the "repair" or demolition of the property (R.556). 
3. The internal report of September 14, 1988 only required the property to be 
"secured" and "boarded up" (R.555). 
4. The February 11, 1989 letter again was not addressed to the owner of the 
property but also provided that the property could be "secured from entry by 
unauthorized personnel'1 (R.553). 
5. The February 11, 1989 letter is an internal letter to the Public Health 
Supervisor to "encourage you and your attorney to begin enforcement" (R.553). But, 
in fact, there was no enforcement by either the Public Health Supervisor or his 
attorney. 
The fact is that the property could have been boarded up at little expense and 
all agencies would have been satisfied. It need not have been demolished. Further, 
it is a fact that no enforcement action was taken against State Line. It was not 
required to do anything. What State Line did was entirely voluntary and unnecessary. 
It acted as if it were the absolute owner of the property and commenced demolition 
of the structures on the property in total disregard of the rights of parties with 
redemption rights. State Line should not be allowed to benefit from its own wrong, 
Prud. Fed. S. & L. Assoc, v. Williams L. Pereira & Assoc, 16 U. 2d 336, 401 P. 2d 
439 (1965), at 441, as it would if the defendants are prevented from redeeming the 
property because of State Line's destruction of the property. 
POINT II 
STATE LINE'S ASSERTION THAT LEWISES FAILED TO OBJECT TO 
THE COURT'S ORDER OF OCTOBER 2, 1989, AFTER THE ORDER 
WAS RENDERED, AND ITS OBJECTION TO REFERENCES TO FACTS 
OCCURRING AFTER THAT HEARING OR THAT ARE NOT 
OTHERWISE IN EVIDENCE, ARE DISINGENUOUS AND WITHOUT 
MERIT. 
In its brief, at page 8, State Line states that Lewises failed to object to the 
court's order at the hearing of October 2, 1989. This statement ignores the fact that 
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Lewises had objected all along to the court's reduction of the time to redeem (R.662, 
pp.14-17), had filed objections to State Line's proposed order on the prior hearing 
(R.595-6) and to the hearing itself (R.589-90), and had argued to the court that it 
should not strike the hearing to determine the redemption price but should go ahead 
with that hearing as it had originally ordered and as Rule 69(f)(3) provided (R.661, 
pp.11-18, 30-33). When the lower court made its ruling at the conclusion of the 
hearing that the full demanded redemption price must be unconditionally on deposit 
the next day, it had overruled all the objections that had been made. The time for 
making objections had then passed. Nevertheless, Lewises asked the court for 
additional time to clear up the conditions on the release of the money on deposit 
(R.661, p.42, lines 16-19) but the court refused to grant any additional time. Thus, 
numerous objections and requests were made and the court rejected them all. Those 
objections have now been brought to this court. 
In a similar vein, State line has objected to Lewises' statement of the reason the 
conditions on the release of the funds were not removed in one day's time (Brief of 
Appellee, p.8, ftn.3). That statement was made in Lewises' brief (p.7) to explain that 
they made every effort to remove those conditions and simply could not do so in one 
day because the lender of those funds insisted on a report on the title to the airplane 
from the Federal Aviation Administration Airmen and Aircraft Registry in Oklahoma 
City, Oklahoma. These are facts which occurred after the hearing and so could not 
be placed in the record of that hearing but make it obvious that the court had placed 
an unfair and impossible burden on Lewises in requiring them to "put up or shut up" 
within one day. That that kind of order is unfair and impossible should be obvious 
on its face without reference to facts which occurred after the hearing. Those facts 
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only confirmed the unfairness of the court's order. The court not only put Lewises 
"under the gun" (R.661, pp.43-43, lines 25-1), but also pulled the trigger. 
Likewise, State Line has objected to the Lewises' statement that they were 
hindered in their efforts to obtain funds to redeem by State Line's demolition of the 
property because there is no evidence in the record of this fact (Brief of Appellee, 
p. 18). Of course, if the court had allowed a hearing, such evidence could have been 
presented to the court. But that is another fact that is obvious on its face without 
any evidence. No proof is required to persuade any reasonable person that it is 
easier to borrow money on an operating motel than on a half-demolished motel. 
Furthermore, this fact was set forth in the affidavit submitted by Lewises (R.642,114). 
Interestingly, State Line objected to the admissibility of that fact on the grounds of 
hearsay (R.661, p.23, lines 15-19) yet, in its brief has cited and quoted the hearsay 
communications between Tooele County and Wendover City (Brief of Appellee, pp.3-
4, 18 ftn.6), to which Lewises objected on hearsay grounds (R.662, p. 15, lines 19-24; 
R.599), as an excuse for its actions. Thus, State Line is inconsistent in its reliance 
upon, or objection to, hearsay evidence. Whether such evidence has been properly 
admitted or not, the facts sought to be established by Lewises are so obvious that 
judicial notice can be taken of them, Little Cottonwood Water Co. v. Kimball 76 
Utah 243, 289 Pac. 116 (1930), at 125, and the opposite of the hearsay facts sought 
to be established by State Line are established by the hearsay evidence itself. (See 
Point I above.) 
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POINT III 
THE RECENT TECH-FLUID SERVICES CASE IS FULLY CONSISTENT 
WITH LEWISES' POSITION THAT REDEMPTION SHOULD BE 
ALLOWED, 
State Line relies heavily on the recent case of Tech-Fluid Services, Inc. v. 
Gavilan Operating, Inc., 787 P.2d (Utah App. 1990) as well as Mollerup v. Storage 
Svs. Int'l. 569 P.2d 1122 (Utah 1977), to argue that its rights as a purchaser at the 
sheriffs sale are substantive rights and cannot be affected except by strict compliance 
with Rule 69(f)(3), U.R.C.P. (Brief of Appellee, p. 11) State Line ignores several 
matters that are stated in those cases and that form a basis for the decisions therein. 
First, the Mollerup language relied upon by State Line is as follows: 
The right of redemption has long been recognized as a substantive right 
to be exercised in strict accord with statutory terms. It is not an equitable 
right created or regulated by principles of equity but, rather, is a creature 
of statute and depends entirely upon the provisions of the statute creating 
the right. 
This clearly states that it is the right of redemption which is a substantive right-
not the right of the purchaser. It is true that Tech-Fluid Services, supra, at 1333, also 
states that the right of the purchaser is substantive. But, the rights of Lewises are 
also substantive and deserve protection at least as much as the rights of State Line. 
That substantive right of redemption is based on "statutory terms", that is the terms 
of Rule 69(f)(3) by reference from §78-37-6, U.C.A. Rule 69(f)(3) is likewise subject 
to the "statutory terms" of Rule 6(b), which allows for the extension of all time 
periods under the rules (with certain stated exceptions), including the right of 
redemption under Rule 69(f)(3), "for cause shown." Thus, the right to an extension 
of the right of redemption for cause shown is very much a part of the substantive 
right held by the Lewises. Thus, anything that might prejudice this substantive right 
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of the Lewises, such as the actions of State Line in this case, must be considered in 
determining whether the procedural technicalities of the rule should be allowed to 
terminate that right. The Tech-Fluid Services court stated, at 1333: 
If failure to adhere to the requirements will affect a substantive right of 
one of the parties and possibly prejudice that party, then courts require 
strict compliance. 
It would be entirely consistent, if the Tech-Fluid Services court had this case before 
it, for it to state: 
If failure by a party to adhere to the requirements will affect a substantive 
right of that party and possibly prejudice that party, the courts will not 
require strict compliance by that party. 
The facts in the record show that the Lewises have more invested in this property 
than State Line (R.516, 1J2). Their right to redeem is indeed substantive and should 
not be terminated for claimed failures to follow technical procedural requirements. 
Second, the Lewises complied strictly with the requirements of Rule 6(b) in 
obtaining an extension of their right to redeem. They showed cause to the court and 
obtained an extension of only 43 days. Within those 43 days, they could have and 
would have fully complied with the requirements of the rule by paying into court the 
full amount demanded for redemption. It was the lower court's reduction and 
termination of the redemption period, at the insistence of State Line, which made 
compliance finally impossible. 
Third, while the Mollerup court, supra, at 1124, stated that the right of 
redemption "is not an equitable right created or regulated by principles of equity," 
it went on to state to the contrary, that is, "a court, sitting in equity, may in 
appropriate instances extend the period." The court referred to its decision in 
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United States v. Loosley. 551 P.2d 506 (Utah 1976) which clearly identifies the 
equitable nature of all aspects of a foreclosure proceeding. That case stated, at 508: 
The proceeding is one in equity in which principles of equity should be 
applied 
Consistent with the foregoing, rules and statutes dealing with redemption 
are regarded as remedial in character and should be given liberal 
construction and application to permit a property owner who can pay his 
debts to do so, and thus make his creditor whole, and save his property. 
Thus, far from excluding principles of equity from governing rights of redemption, 
these cases direct that such principles must be the very foundation of any decision 
affecting rights of redemption. The Tech-Fluid Services case is no different. In fact, 
the decision in that case upholding the redemption was based entirely on United 
States v. Loosley. The court stated, at 1334: 
Based upon the authority discussed above, and in particular Loosley, we 
affirm that substantial compliance is the proper test under Rule 69(f)(2). 
Moreover, because the Court found substantial compliance in Loosley, we 
are obliged to find it in this case. Tech-Fluid's position is even weaker 
than the Griffiths' position was in Loosley. 
Lewises have cited United States v. Loosley not just for these equitable 
principles which must govern redemption rights but also to demonstrate that, if an 
attempt to redeem cannot be refused based on the small technicalities present in that 
case, it should not be prevented by such gross conduct as the destruction of the 
improvements on the property itself! Thus, contrary to State Line's claim, Loosley 
provides substantial support for the Lewises. 
Fourth, the court in Tech-Fluid Services pointed out that Tech-Fluid, the buyer 
at the sheriffs sale, "failed to demonstrate any prejudice from the failure to strictly 
adhere to the requirements . . . . " Likewise, State Line has failed to demonstrate any 
prejudice to it from any alleged failure to strictly adhere to the requirements of the 
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rule. It has claimed only that it was delayed in obtaining a sheriffs deed on the 
property. That, of course, is not a showing of prejudice. Furthermore, the delay 
sought by Lewises was only 43 days. Any delay beyond that is entirely the result of 
the State Line's attempt to dissolve the original extension. And, of course, the initial 
delay of 43 days was the result of State Line's demolition of the property. The only 
prejudice in this case is that caused by State Line to the Lewises. Therefore, the 
principles of equity require a liberal construction of the rules to allow a redemption 
of the property. 
POINT IV 
LEWISES' CLAIM OF WRONGFUL ACTIONS BY STATE LINE IS NOT 
RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL AND IS NOT 
SPECULATION OR UNFOUNDED ACCUSATION. 
State Line has asserted that Lewises have sought an extension of the redemption 
period based on "speculations and unfounded accusations" of "wrongful activity" 
raised for the first time on appeal (Brief of Appellee, p. 14). Because the lower court 
did not allow a hearing on these matters, we do not know yet whether the actions of 
State Line in destroying the property were intended to make it impossible for Lewises 
to redeem. We may never know that since intent is so difficult to prove. However, 
there is no speculation about the fact that State Line's actions were wrongful. Those 
actions clearly interfered with Lewises' right to redeem the property and regain 
possession thereof in the condition it was in at the time of the sheriffs sale. That 
was wrongful and those actions were also intentional in the sense that State Line 
intended to demolish the improvements on the property. What is unknown by the 
Lewises and the court is whether State Line intended to interfere with Lewises' 
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redemption right by such demolition. No such accusation has been made. Lewises 
have only stated that that kind of intent is unknown. 
The point is that even if State Line had no intent to interfere with Lewises' right 
to redeem, its actions have interfered with that right. If it is allowed to so interfere 
unintentionally, the door is open for it, or anyone else in a similar situation, to 
interfere intentionally, and with impunity, since such intent may be impossible to 
prove. The actions of State Line were wrongful without reference 1o its intent. This 
point is not raised for the first time on appeal. It is the whole point of this appear-
and of Lewises' attempt to redeem by obtaining an extension of the redemption 
period, by filing a petition to determine the reasonableness and propriety of the 
redemption price and by depositing $50,000.00 with the court below. 
POINT V 
A REDEMPTIONER IS NOT A PURCHASER AND A PURCHASER IS 
NOT A TENANT IN POSSESSION UNDER RULE 69(g)(1). 
CONSISTENCY IN INTERPRETATION REQUIRES THAT RULE 69(f) (3) 
PROVIDE THE REMEDY FOR REDEMPTIONERS. 
In its inconsistent attempt to construe Rule 69(f)(3) strictly so as to allow no 
deductions from the redemption amount while arguing for a very liberal construction 
of Rule 69(g)(1), State Line argues that the term "purchaser" in that rule includes 
anyone "who pays money for property" and thus must include one who redeems 
property for money (Brief of Appellee, p.24). It attempts to find support for its 
position by quoting from Black's Law Dictionary that a purchaser is "one who 
acquires either real or personal property by buying it for a price in money." This 
argument ignores the fact that Rule 69(e), (f) and (g), in every instance, uses the 
term "purchaser" to refer to the one who submits the successful bid at the sheriffs 
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sale and uses the term "redemptioner" to identify the judgment debtor or creditor 
who actually redeems. The terms are mutually exclusive as used in the rule. The 
purchaser at the sale actually purchases the property by bidding at the sale. A 
redemptioner does not purchase the property by redeeming from the sale. In fact, 
the redemptioner can only be the judgment debtor or a creditor who already has an 
interest in the property who is seeking to protect that interest by redeeming it from 
the purchaser. Rule 69(f)(1), U.R.C.P. He has previously purchased his interest in 
the property or obtained his interest by loan to the then owner of the property. His 
redemption of the property is not, in any sense, a purchase of the property but only 
an act to hold on to what he has previously purchased. Even under the broad 
definition from Black's Law Dictionary, he is not acquiring the property by buying it 
for a price in money. He has already bought it and, in redeeming, pays an amount 
which a stranger to the title has bid for the property and which has no relationship 
to his prior purchase price. 
Nor can a redemptioner properly be considered a successor in interest to the 
purchaser. The case of Tanner v. Lawler. 6 U.2d 84, 305 P.2d 882 (1957), aff d on 
rehearing, 6 U.2d 268, 311 P.2d 791 (1957), holds that the status of liens against the 
property is very different for a purchaser at the sheriffs sale than for a 
redemptioner. The purchaser buys the property free and clear of all liens junior to 
the lien being foreclosed. The redemptioner, however, may take the property subject 
to all liens against the property. See Rule 69(f)(5), U.R.C.P. Thus, a redemptioner 
is not legally in the same position as a purchaser and does not become the successor 
in interest to the purchaser. If he buys an assignment of the purchaser's certificate 
of sale, he then becomes his successor in interest and can be regarded as the 
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purchaser. But a redemption from the sale places the redemptioner in a very 
different category. 
Similarly, State Line argues for a liberal construction of Rule 69(g)(1) to include 
itself within the term "tenant in possession." It relies again on its selective definition 
from Black's Law Dictionary to argue that a tenant is, "in the broadest sense, one 
who holds or possesses lands or tenements by any kind of right or title," and ignores 
the more common definition of a tenant as "one who has the temporary use and 
occupation of real property owned by another person (called the 'landlord'), the 
duration and terms of his tenancy being usually fixed by an instrument called a 
iease.'" Black's, at p. 1635.4 Under any commonly understood meaning of the term, 
State Line was not a "tenant in possession" of the property. It had no lease. It paid 
no rent. It had no agreement with the owner of the property. It was the purchaser 
of the property with the right to receive rents from the "tenant in possession." In 
fact, Rule 69(f)(6), covering "rents during the period of redemption," makes it clear 
that the "purchaser" and the "tenant in possession" are different parties. Under that 
provision, the "tenant in possession" is one who is already in possession of the 
property at the time of the sheriff's sale under some prior lease or arrangement with 
the judgment debtor. Rule 69, on its face, does not allow for the kind of pulling and 
stretching of its language attempted by State Line to justify its claim that Rule 
69(g)(1) is the exclusive remedy for Lewises in this case. 
4See also The Random House Dictionary of the English Language, p. 1462 
(Unabridged Edition, 1967) "Tenant . . . 2. Law. a person who holds or 
possesses for a time lands, tenements, or personalty of another, usually for 
rent." 
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Even if that rule were to be so broadly interpreted to make Lewises a purchaser 
and State Line a tenant in possession, it does not make its remedy exclusive. Rule 
69(f)(3), and even Rule 69(f)(6), could, with much less pulling and stretching of 
language, be interpreted to allow Lewises a remedy by a simple hearing to determine 
the value of the damage State Line has done to the property before putting the full 
$256,000.00 demanded by it in its hands with perhaps no adequate means to recover 
for that damage. 
State Line confesses in its argument for liberal construction of Rule 69(g)(1), 
that "any other result would treat the redemptioner harshly without any justifiable 
basis" (Brief of Appellee, p.24). Why, then, doesn't a refusal to also liberally 
construe Rule 69(f)(3) to allow a determination of whether the "sum demanded for 
redemption is reasonable or proper" also "treat the redemptioner harshly without any 
justifiable basis"? We ask only consistency in the interpretation of the rules. That 
consistency, combined with a view of the purpose of each provision, would suggest 
that Rule 69(f)(3) be used to provide the requested remedy to redemptioners against 
improper actions by purchasers and that Rule 69(g)(1) be used to protect purchasers 
at the sale from improper actions by a tenant in possession. Rule 69(f)(3) is the 
provision which governs the proceedings in this case. 
POINT VI 
HAVING SUBMITTED ITSELF TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE 
COURT, STATE LINE IS SUBJECT TO AND IS THE BENEFICIARY OF 
THOSE RULES INCLUDING PROVISIONS FOR ACCELERATED 
HEARINGS, THERE IS NO LACK OF DUE PROCESS IN THAT AND 
STATE LINE IS NOT PREJUDICED THEREBY. 
State Line has argued that it would be denied due process if it is required to 
defend itself in a hearing under Rule 69(f)(3). It claims Rule 69(g)(1) provides the 
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appropriate procedure because it requires a separate action to be filed, thus 
providing State Line with the due process of service of process, time for discovery 
and trial. This argument again ignores several important factors. 
First, State Line voluntarily made itself a party to this case when it purchased 
at the sale. Nobody sued State Line or forced it to come in to this action to defend 
itself. When its bid at the sheriffs sale was accepted, it submitted itself to the 
jurisdiction of the court and to all of the provisions of the rules governing the 
sheriffs sale and redemption. Service of process was not necessary. 
Second, State Line's demand for $14,134.20 for "repairs/maintenance securing 
of property" (R.579), which was actually a demand for the costs of demolishing the 
property (R.662, p.6, lines 5-6), is a demand which Lewises dispute. They would also 
like to have time to conduct discovery as to what State Line did and of the 
documents supporting the demand and to obtain evidence from experts that 
$14,134.20 was not reasonable or proper. Yet, that is a dispute which State Line 
admits is governed by Rule 69(f)(3) and Lewises might have to prepare for a hearing 
on that matter within the two days provided in the rule. The same could be said for 
a dispute over taxes, insurance premiums, and other matters. That would be unfair 
to Lewises, yet it is clearly within the rule. In this case, no hearing was scheduled 
within two days. Instead, the Lewises intentionally requested the hearing 30 days 
later in order to give State Line plenty of time to prepare (R.662, p.14, lines 1-5). 
In fact, State Line's attorney agreed to that, stating "Would it be appropriate, since 
we are on [an] expedited hearing which I have no objection to, if the Court could 
order expedited discovery so we would be prepared and have our witnesses ready" 
(R.660, p.4, lines 22-25). The court agreed to that request and both parties 
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thereafter agreed to submit to depositions if so requested. The lack of due process 
argument is another one used after the fact. At the time, State Line was anxious to 
expedite a hearing and decision on the matter. If State Line wants more than 30 
days to prepare for a hearing, Lewises are willing to allow whatever time it needs. 
Third, it is the redeeming party, not the purchaser at the sale, who needs due 
process, that is, notice and time to prepare for a hearing. Since the purchaser is the 
party who has paid for any taxes, assessments, insurance premiums, upkeep or repair 
and who has demolished or otherwise damaged the property, the purchaser already 
has in hand all the information to prepare for a hearing on these matters. The 
redemptioner, however, has no knowledge of his own and is the one who needs time 
and opportunity to discover this information in order to prepare for a hearing. State 
Line's demand for time to fully litigate this matter is clearly misplaced. The Lewises, 
and all other redemptioners, must operate within the requirements of Rule 69(f)(3). 
Surely State Line, and all other purchasers, with all of the evidence in their hands, 
can also meet those requirements. State Line would suffer no lack of due process. 
Fourth, State Line's argument for a separate action under Rule 69(g)(1) 
reinforces the differences among a redemptioner, purchaser, and tenant in possession 
established under Point V above. The remedy against a tenant in possession for 
waste under Rule 69(g)(1) requires a separate action precisely because the tenant in 
possession is not a party to the pending suit. He has not inserted himself into the 
action. If the purchaser has a claim against the tenant, he must serve him with 
process and allow him all the rights of any defendant in a suit before judgment is 
entered. The purchaser, however, has submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the 
court by his purchase after the case has been litigated and has gone to judgment. He 
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is subject to all the rules governing post-judgment remedies and also has the 
advantage of the portions of those rules which are designed to protect him, such as 
Rule 69(g)2) in case he is unable to obtain possession of the property. Along with 
the benefit of that rule, he must accept the burden of Rule 69(e)(4) to compel 
payment of the purchase price and of Rule 69(f)(3) to challenge the reasonableness 
or propriety of his demanded redemption amount. 
State Line would suffer no lack of due process under these rules. Having 
submitted itself to the rules, it must accept the burdens as well as the benefits of 
those rules. The court has sufficient power to grant State Line whatever time it 
needs to prepare for a hearing under Rule 69(f)(3). 
POINT VII 
THE CASES RELIED UPON BY STATE LINE ACTUALLY SUPPORT 
LEWISES' RIGHT TO A HEARING AND TO RECOUP OR OFFSET THE 
COST TO REPAIR AGAINST THE REDEMPTION AMOUNT. 
Despite the fact that "any sum demanded for redemption11 may be challenged 
under Rule 69(f)(3), State Line has questioned the use of that rule to resolve the 
total question of the redemption amount by reference to various cases which it claims 
would deny such relief. The cases cited by State Line are either totally inapplicable 
or actually support the position of the Lewises. For example, State Line claims that 
Goodwin v. Donahue, 299 Ala. 66, 155 So. 587 (1934), requires a tender of the 
demanded redemption amount before the sheriffs sale purchaser is liable for rent 
or waste. In addition to the fact that this case was based on the words of a different 
statute, the court held that a tender is not required if "sufficient excuse for the failure 
to do so" is alleged (at p. 589). The court then allowed the redemptioner to amend 
his petition to allege facts that would constitute sufficient excuse. 
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Likewise, Hansen v. Day, 99 Ore. 387, 195 Pac. 344 (1921), recognized the 
redemptioner's right to a deduction from the redemption amount for the value of use 
of the property and for waste committed on the property if there are equitable 
grounds such as insolvency or nonresidency of the purchaser. The relief was denied 
in that case only because the redemptioner failed to prove the equitable grounds 
alleged. But the right to the deduction upon equitable grounds is clearly recognized. 
In a similar holding in a case involving an attempt by a tenant to offset an 
unrelated debt due from his landlord against rent due from the tenant, Investor Inns. 
Inc. v. Wallace, 408 So.2d 978 (Ga. 1981) denied the offset only because the tenant 
failed to prove the offsetting debt. Otherwise, the offset would have been allowed. 
In Skinner v. W, T. Grant Co., 642 F.2d 981 (1981), the court did not reach the 
question of whether an offset was allowed against charge account debts under the 
Louisiana statute because the contract between the parties expressly allowed 
reductions for defenses, offsets or counterclaims. Therefore, the offsets, if proved, 
were to be allowed. The language quoted by State Line from Investor Inns and 
Skinner is based on the Louisiana statute and, therefore, has no bearing on the 
common law or equitable considerations applicable to offset or recoupment in this 
case. 
State Line's reliance on Faber, Coe & Gregg, Inc. v. First National Bank of 
Chicago. 107 111. App. 2d 204, 246 N.E.2d 96 (1969), is entirely misplaced since that 
case involves the right of a bank to apply a customer's deposits against an unmatured 
debt due from the customer without authority from the customer to do so. In that 
case there was no legal proceeding involved. The bank had acted on its own to apply 
the deposits against the debt in violation of the contract between the bank and the 
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customer. Similarly, in Associated Oil Co. of Wvo. v. Rector, 50 P.2d 551 (Colo. 
1935), the claimed offset was disallowed because the contract between the parties did 
not allow it. Those cases have no application to this case. 
State Line cites Mark VII Financial Consultants Corp. v. Smedlev, 792 P.2d 130 
(Utah App. 1990), and Rogue River Management Co. v. Shaw. 243 Ore. 54, 411 P.2d 
440 (1966), as authority for the proposition that recoupment or setoff may only be 
used defensively by a defendant against a plaintiffs claim. That was not the holding 
of either of those cases. Mark VII held that the bank could not offset a claim against 
one party against a debt it owed to another party but stated that "courts have broad 
discretion to allow claims to be joined in order to expedite the resolution of all 
controversies between the parties in one suit" (at 132). 
State Line's position is that, since it did not commence this suit, Lewises cannot 
assert recoupment or offset against it. "Stateline has not made any claims against the 
Lewises in this or any other case and is only a party because it purchased the 
property at a sheriffs sale" (Brief of Appellee, p.36). That argument again ignores 
the fact that State Line inserted itself into this suit by buying at the sale and 
submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court and to all the rules applicable to such 
sales and redemption therefrom (See Point VI, above). The fact is that State Line 
has made a claim against Lewises for $256,599.45 in order to redeem the property. 
State Line, by purchasing at the sale, has stepped into the shoes of the plaintiff in its 
attempt to collect this amount from Lewises or the other defendants. If the money 
is not paid, the property goes to the plaintiff or to State Line as the plaintiffs 
successor in interest. Neither the plaintiff nor State Line had the right to destroy the 
defendants' property and any of the defendants, including the Lewises, have the right, 
by payment or tender of the redemption amount, to have the property in the 
condition it was in before the sheriffs sale. If the plaintiff or State Line has 
destroyed that property, the redeeming parties have the right to challenge "any sum 
demanded for redemption" and have the court determine whether it is "reasonable 
or proper" to reduce the amount demanded by the cost to restore the property to the 
condition it was in at the time of the sheriffs sale. Under Rule 69(f)(3), Lewises 
were only obligated to deposit into court the amount demanded "less the amount in 
dispute." They disputed the whole $256,599.45 because their bid to repair the 
damage was $388,501.00 (R.539). Nevertheless, they deposited $50,000.00 into court 
and were prepared to pay any additional amount the court might determine. Lewises 
have fully complied with Rule 69(f)(3) and are clearly entitled to assert their dispute 
over the amount demanded defensively against the demand made by State Line. The 
court has "broad discretion to allow claims to be joined in order to expedite the 
resolution of all controversies between the parties in one suit" Mark VII, supra, at 
132. The Lewises had the right to "cut back" or "hold back" from the sum demanded 
for redemption the cost to restore the property and thus receive exactly that to which 
they are entitled upon redemption. This is exactly what the term "recoupment" 
means. Rogue River Management Co. v. Shaw, supra, at 442. 
CONCLUSION 
State Line was under no compulsion of any kind to demolish the improvements 
on the property. It could have secured the buildings by boarding them up. Even that 
was not required by any order from Wendover City or Tooele County. Its claim that 
it complied with the desires of governmental officials is an after the fact excuse. 
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Lewises made numerous objections to the orders of the lower court, including 
its final order. Lewises' statements as to the reasons they could not comply with that 
order and could not obtain a loan on a demolished hotel were entirely proper 
because they were obvious facts about which the court could take judicial notice. 
Lewises have fully complied with the requirements of the rules and have a legal 
right to the relief requested. Nevertheless, their right to redeem is a substantive 
right which, in the absence of any prejudice to State Line and in the presence of 
obvious prejudice to them, is deserving of the assistance of equity. The recent Tech-
Fluid Services case does not change but rather supports that conclusion. State Line's 
demolition of the property was wrongful without regard to its intent and is the whole 
reason why there is a dispute as to the redemption price and extension of the 
redemption period. Lewises have been prejudiced by that and that issue has not 
been raised for the first time on appeal. 
Lewises are not "purchasers" and State Line is not a "tenant in possession" 
under Rule 69. Rather, Lewises are "redemptioners" and State Line is the 
"purchaser". Those are terms of art as used in the rule. Rule 69(f)(3) provides 
remedies for redemptioners against the purchaser and is, therefore, the rule which 
governs this case. Rule 69(g)(1) provides remedies for "purchasers" and is, therefore, 
inapplicable. Consistency in interpretation and application requires this construction. 
There is more due process provided to State Line than to the Lewises in Rule 
69(f)(3) and the court has discretion to allow any further "due process" State Line 
may need or request. 
State Line has demanded $256,599.45 from Lewises to redeem the property. 
Lewises dispute that entire sum and are entitled to defend themselves against that 
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demand. That defense can be asserted as a challenge to the reasonableness and 
propriety of that whole sum under Rule 69(f)(3), as a reduction from that sum under 
the legal principles of recoupment or offset or as an equitable adjustment under the 
principles of equity. Since State Line stands in the shoes of the plaintiff in collecting 
the debt secured by the Lewises' property, it must deliver that property in the 
condition it was in at the time of the sheriffs sale upon payment of the redemption 
amount. Since it cannot do that, its demand must be reduced accordingly. 
The lower court's decision should be reversed and a Rule 69(f)(3) hearing 
scheduled to determine what is a reasonable and proper redemption amount. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
Ralph J. MarSh 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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ADDENDUM 
STATUTES AND RULES TO BE INTERPRETED 
Utah Code Annotated 
§78-37-6 Right of redemption-Sales by parcels-Of land and water stock 
Sales of real estate under judgments of foreclosure of mortgages and liens are 
subject to redemption as in case of sales under executions generally. In all cases 
where the judgment directs the sale of land, together with shares of corporate stock 
evidencing title to a water right used or intended to be used, or suitable for use, on 
the land, the court shall equitably apportion such water stock to the land, or some 
part thereof, in one or more parcels, as it may deem suitable for the sale thereof, and 
the land and water stock in each parcel shall be sold together, and for the purpose 
of such sale shall be regarded as real estate and subject to redemption as above 
specified. In all sales of real estate under foreclosure the court may determine the 
parcels and the order in which such parcels of property shall be sold. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 6. Time. 
(b) Enlargement. When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by 
order of the court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified 
time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) with or without 
motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefor is made before the 
expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order or 
(2) upon motion made after the expiration of the specified period permit the act to 
be done where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect; but it may not 
extend the time for taking any action under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), 
60(b) and 73(a) and (g), except to the extent and under the conditions stated in 
them. 
Rule 69. Execution and proceedings supplemental thereto. 
(e) Proceedings on sale of property. 
(4) Purchaser refusing to pay. Every bid shall be deemed an irrevocable 
offer; and if the purchaser refuses to pay the amount bid by him for the property 
struck off to him at a sale under execution, the officer may again sell the property 
at any time to the highest bidder, and if any loss is occasioned thereby, the party 
refusing to pay, in addition to being liable on such bid, is guilty of a contempt of 
court and may be punished accordingly. When a purchaser refuses to pay, the officer 
may also, in his discretion, thereafter reject any other bid of such person. 
(f) Redemption from sale, 
(1) Who May Redeem, Property sold subject to redemption, or any part 
sold separately, may be redeemed by the following persons or their successors in 
interest: (1) the judgment debtor; (2) a creditor having a lien by judgment or 
mortgage on the property sold, or on some share or part thereof, subsequent to that 
on which the property was sold. 
(3) Time for redemption; amount to be paid. The property may be 
redeemed from the purchaser within six months after the sale on paying the amount 
of his purchase with 6 percent thereon in addition, together with the amount of any 
assessment or taxes, and any reasonable sum for fire insurance and necessary 
maintenance, upkeep, or repair of any improvements upon the property which the 
purchaser may have paid thereon after the purchase, with interest on such amounts, 
and, if the purchaser is also a creditor having a lien prior to that of the person 
seeking redemption, other than the judgment under which said purchase was made, 
the amount of such lien, with interest. 
In the event there is a disagreement as to whether any sum demanded for 
redemption is reasonable or proper, the person seeking redemption may pay the 
amount necessary for redemption, less the amount in dispute, to the court out of 
which execution or order authorizing the sale was issued, and at the same time file 
with the court a petition setting forth the item or items demanded to which he 
objects, together with his grounds of objection; and thereupon the court shall enter 
an order fixing a time for hearing of such objections. A copy of the petition and 
order fixing time for hearing shall be served on the purchaser not less than two days 
before the day of hearing. Upon the hearing of the objections the court shall enter 
an order determining the amount required for redemption. In the event an 
additional amount to that therefore paid to the clerk is required, the person seeking 
redemption shall pay to the clerk such additional amount within 7 days. The 
purchaser shall forthwith execute and deliver a proper certificate of redemption upon 
being paid the amount required by the court for redemption. 
(5) Where no redemption is made. If no redemption is made within six 
months after the sale, the purchaser or his assigned is entitled to a conveyance; or 
if so redeemed, whenever sixty days have elapsed and no other redemption by a 
creditor has been made and notice thereof has been given, the last redemptioner, or 
his assignee, is entitled to a sheriffs deed at the expiration of six months after the 
sale. If the judgment debtor redeems, he must make the same payments as required 
to effect a redemption by a creditor. If the debtor redeems, the effect of the sale is 
terminated and he is restored to his estate. Upon a redemption by the debtor, the 
person to whom the payment is made must execute and deliver to him a certificate 
of redemption, duly acknowledged. Such certificate must be filed and recorded in the 
office of the county recorder hwere the property is situated. . 
(6) Rents during period of redemption. The purchaser from the time of 
sale until a redemption, and a redemptioner from the time of his redemption until 
another redemption, is entitled to receive from the tenant in possession the rents of 
the property sold or the value of the use and occupation thereof. But when any rents 
or profits have been received by the judgment creditor or purchaser, or his or their 
assigns, from the property thus sold preceding such redemption, the amounts of such 
rents and profits shall be a credit upon the redemption money to be paid; and if the 
redemptioner or judgment debtor, before the expiration of the time allowed for such 
redemption, demands in writing of such purchaser or creditor, or his assigns, a 
written and verified statement of the amounts of such rents and profits thus received, 
the period for redemption is extended five days after such sworn statement is given 
by such purchaser or his assigns to such redemptioner or debtor. If such purchaser 
or his assigns shall for a period of one month from and after such demand, fail or 
refuse to give such statement, such redemptioner or debtor may, within sixty days 
after such demand, bring an action to compel an accounting and disclosure of such 
rents and profits, and until fifteen days from and after the final determination of such 
action the right of redemption is extended to such redemptioner or debtor. 
(g) Remedies of purchaser. 
(1) For waste. Until the expiration of the time allowed for redemption, 
the court may restrain the commission of waste on the property, upon motion, with 
or without notice, of the purchaser, or his successor in interest. But it is not waste 
for the person in possession of the property at the time of sale, or entitled to 
possession afterwards, during the period allowed for redemption, to continue to use 
it in the same manner in which it was previously used, or to use it in the ordinary 
course of husbandry, or to make the necessary repairs or (sic) buildings thereon or 
to use wood or timber on the property therefor, or for the repair of fences, or for 
fuel for his family while he occupies the property. After his estate has become 
absolute, the purchaser or his successor in interest may maintain an action to recover 
damages for injury to the property by the tenant in possession after sale and before 
possession is delivered under the conveyance. 
(2) Where purchaser fails to obtain possession of property or is 
dispossessed thereof or evicted therefrom. Where, because of irregularities in the 
proceedings concerning the sale, or because the property sold was not subject to 
execution and sale, or because of the reversal or discharge of- the judgment, a 
purchaser of property sold on execution, or his successor in interest, fails to obtain 
the property or is dispossessed thereof or evicted therefrom, the court having 
jurisdiction thereof shall, on motion of such party and after such notice to the 
judgment creditor as the court may prescribe, enter judgment against such judgment 
creditor for the price paid by the purchaser, together with interest. In the 
alternative, if such purchaser or his successor in interest, fails to recover possession 
of any property or is dispossessed thereof or evicted therefrom in consequence of 
irregularity in the proceedings concerning the sale, or because the property sold was 
not subject to execution and sale, the court having jurisdiction thereof shall, on 
motion of such party and after such notice to the judgment debtor as the court may 
prescribe, revive the original judgment in the name of the petitioner for the amount 
paid by such purchaser at the sale, with interest thereon from the time of payment 
at the same rate that the original judgment bore; and the judgment so revived shall 
have the same force and effect as would an original judgment of the date of the 
revival. 
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